[Premessa, pp.1-20; translated by komponisto]
A reading of the ruling of the Corte di Assise di Appello of Perugia  makes necessary a critique of the method employed: the first-level ruling is summarized in a few lines, and, in what follows, in every case, the arguments of the defense consultants or the reconstructive hypotheses most beneficial to the defense’s theories are, almost exclusively, favored [valorizzati] (for example, the attribution of greater reliability to the first rather than second statements of Romanelli regarding the closing of the shutters). This seems in line with a sort of prejudice, declared moreover at the outset, the fact that nothing was certain except the death of Meredith Kercher — a disconcerting statement in itself, made as it was in opening remarks, and vainly justified in the ruling (cf. p. 25) with the assertion that, since all the points of the first-level ruling were being appealed, nothing was to be considered certain; which serves to reinforce the idea of prejudice, rather than refuting it.
In pursuing this objective, the C.A.A. fell into errors of method, and into the substantial[ly] erroneous evaluation of the facts introduced, which influenced the correctness of the decision in a decisive manner.
Independently of the specific examination that will be reserved for each ground [of appeal], the types of errors committed by the C.A.A. can be summarized broadly as follows:
1. The method of reasoning, founded on the so-called petitio principii, addressed [risolto] in the form of defective motivation: absent or apparent motivation (C.P.P. Article 606 (e)).
2. The failure to observe principles of law set forth by the Cassazione regarding circumstantial cases (Article 606 (b)) in relation to C.P.P. Article 192, paragraph 2).
3. The violation of the principle set forth by C.P.P. Article 238-bis regarding usability and probative value of irrevocable rulings introduced into the trial C.P.P Article 606 (b)).
4. The failure to observe the mandate under C.P.P. Article 237 in relation to the introduction into the trial of the so-called note [memoriale] of Amanda Marie Knox], which the C.A.A. did not take into account at all, asserting facts contradicted by the content of said note.
5. The failure to introduce decisive evidence, consisting:
a) in the performing of a genetic analysis on the sample taken from the knife — Exhibit 36 — by the experts appointed by the Court at the appeal trial, who did not proceed to the analysis of that sample, violating a specific request [quesito] contained in the expert assignment.
b) in the failure to [re]call witness Aviello, who had already been examined at the defense’s behest during the appeal trial, and whose re-examination the General Prosecutor had requested, since the witness had retracted his trial statements and made important statements about Kercher’s murder. We refer to paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 on this point.
6. Defect of so-called “misrepresentation of evidence”, committed several times, as will be seen later, by the C.A.A., which ignored the establishment of facts in irremediable contrast with its own reconstruction of the facts. In this way the ruling falls into the defect of contradiction and manifest illogicality of the motivation (C.P.P Article 606 (e)). We refer to paragraphs nos. 5, 8, and 10 on this point.
1. The petitio principii
Among the logical errors that may be found in the motivation of the C.A.A.’s ruling, one is so frequent as to be indicative of an outright methodological error. The fallacy (error of logic, error of reasoning) to which the C.A.A. succumbs on several occasions is that of petitio principii, also known as “begging the question”. “To beg the question (or to commit petitio principii [insertion presumably by G.&C.]) means to assume the truth of what one is seeking to prove, in the course of attempting to prove it.” 
“This would seem to be an obvious error, evident to all — but just how manifest or foolish the error is depends to a large extent on how the premises of the argument are expressed. The way they are verbally formulated often obscures the fact that the conclusion itself is buried in one of the assumed premises.”
“Those who fall into this error often do not realize that they have assumed that which was to be demonstrated. The step where the assumption is made can be hidden by the presence of confusing synonyms which are not recognizable as such, or by a chain of arguments that follow. Every petitio is a circular argument, but the circle that one has constructed — if it is very wide and of vague contours — is not recognized.”
This type of fallacy, in legal contexts, was noted already in ancient times, as Simona C. Sagnotti reports in her Retorica e logica [“Rhetoric and Logic”].
She includes the petitio principii itself in a section [paragrafo] devoted to fallacies [fallacie], explaining that “an argument which repeats the premise in the conclusion is not correct”. According to Sagnotti, this is a “fallacy [paralogismo] which derives from assuming the proposition which one was given to prove at the beginning.”
To clarify the concept, it will be helpful [è bene] to give an obvious [lampante] example of petitio principii, keeping in mind, however, that this type of fallacy is usually less apparent, and thus requires greater logical and hermeneutic effort to detect. The example, which can also be found in the volume by Copi and Cohen cited above, is the following: “We cannot all be famous, because we cannot all be well known.” The futility of such an argument is evident. In fact, the conclusion does nothing other than repeat the premise, which it was our task to demonstrate. This is equivalent to saying that the feigned or apparent conclusion adds nothing — precisely nothing — to the premise, which remains entirely undemonstrated.
At this point, in advance of our examination of the individual points of the C.A.A.’s motivation, it will be useful, by way of example, to give a preview of the ways in which the ruling under appeal makes its argument regarding Knox’s accusation of Patrick Lumumba. An accusation for which — it will be recalled — Knox was convicted of the crime of calumny precisely on the basis of the decision made by the C.A.A. itself.
In this case, the territorial Court maintains that Knox accused Lumumba because she was, in some manner, confronted with a [text] message exchanged between Knox herself and Lumumba.
If we analyze the reasoning of the ruling on this point, the Court reasons as follows: it hypothesizes that Knox accused[*] Lumumba only because he [recte: she] was confronted with the telephone message, therefore (conclusion) Knox accused[*] Lumumba because the person(s) listening to her told her that there had been a message between her and Lumumba.
Thus, as we see, the ruling does nothing but repeat in the conclusion what was in the premise, which moreover, remains unproven. Since, from a logical [logico-giuridico] point of view this is not a tautology, but rather a feigned inference, to reach a correct conclusion, the ruling would have to have, at the very least, demonstrated the truth/certainty of the premise. [But] of such a demonstration there is not only not a single trace, but not even an attempt at proof. The hypothesis is just posited, without any logical foundation.
Its repetition in the conclusion generates nothing but a “vicious circle” which leads nowhere.
Logical errors of this sort are common throughout the motivation of the C.A.A.’s ruling, and will be indicated in the individual points.
It is precisely because of observations like the one we have just made that one must conclude that the entire structure [impianto] of the ruling of the C.A.A. is characterized by falling into the very error that it claims to find in the motivation of the first-level Court’s guilty verdict: founding its own theory not even on probabilities but on mere possibilities. None of the arguments [assunti] contained in the first-level decision have been invalidated [inficiati] by the motivation of the appeal ruling; indeed, the C.A.A. has not disputed the judgements formulated by the first-level judges with a logical motivation that respects the results of the trial, but rather has confined itself to “not excluding” hypotheses contrary to those formulated by the prosecution and accepted by the C.A., by means of arguments that are inconclusive, circular, and, thus, futile. Inadequate, therefore, to the task of refuting what was, on the other hand, correctly argued by the first-level judge regarding the guilt of the defendants.
2. Violation of principles of law which govern a circumstantial case
In the course of a trial, verification of the prosecution hypothesis, and the result of such verification — what lawyers call “legal truth” [“verità processuale”] — can be arrived at either with so-called direct evidence [prove dirette], i.e. facts and circumstances that demonstrate the guilt or innocence of the accused, or with so-called circumstantial evidence [indizi], consisting of circumstances, themselves certain, by means of which one can [hope to] access [risalire [a]] the uncertain fact that is the prosecution’s hypothesis.
With the enactment of C.P.P. Article 192, our legislature has set forth the rules for assessing evidence in a criminal trial. Circumstantial evidence is dealt with in the second paragraph of the Article, which specifies that “The existence of a fact cannot be inferred [desunta] from circumstantial evidence unless the latter is serious, precise, and consistent [gravi, precisi, e concordanti].”
The Corte di Cassazione, conscious of the risks connected to a decision based on evidence as weak [labile] as the circumstantial kind, has — while reiterating the correctness of assessing evidence mainly on the basis of “likelihood and the teachings of experience” [“verosimiglianza e sulle massime di esperienza”] — stated in general that a judgement of likelihood is valid only when “one is able to plausibly rule out every alternative explanation which would invalidate the hypothesis that is apparently most likely”.
In a ruling from 1995, legitimacy jurisprudence [i.e. the Corte di Cassazione] explained the logical/inductive operation dictated by the legislature in the 2nd paragraph of C.P.P. Article 192. The Court explained that “The freely-held opinion [Il libero convincimento] of the judge in a circumstantial case, which manifests itself at the moment of assessment of evidence, is the correct result of a logical/inductive operation in which the teaching of experience is the major premise, the evidence is the minor premise, and the conclusion is the proof of the fact under examination, at which one arrives if the evidence is serious (that is to say resistant to objection and therefore convincing), precise (i.e. not susceptible to differing interpretation that is at least as likely), and consistent [concordanti] (which is to say not in contrast with itself and with other evidence that is certain).”
The adjective “consistent” means that each piece of evidence [indizio] — even if it must be assessed individually — must flow together with the others in a logical and unified reconstruction of the unknown fact.
Besides the characteristics specifically envisioned by the law under examination, legitimacy jurisprudence has furthermore required that a fact or a circumstance can become evidence only when it is invested with the character of certainty.
This requirement is to be considered inherent in the wording [precisione del precetto] of C.P.P. Article 192: along with the certainty of the circumstance, legal verification of the actual existence of the circumstance itself is required. Indeed, it cannot [possibly] be permissible to base critical (indirect) proof on a fact, assumed or intuited, that [merely] likely occurred, [thereby] illegitimately privileging personal impressions or imaginations of the judge — contrary to unquestioned principles of legal tradition [civiltà giuridica].
According to the most recent guidance from the United Sections of the Cassazione , the assessment of circumstantial evidence does not stop at a mere summation [sommatoria] of the evidence, and must therefore include the prior evaluation [valutazione preventiva] of each piece of evidence individually, each according to its own qualitative value and degree of precision and gravity; so that it may then be assessed in a unified, global perspective which will tend to bring to light its connections and convergence within a single probative context.
But in addition to these learned definitions of the method of assessing circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court has also suggested to the merit judge how to conduct the evaluation of multiple pieces of evidence of a circumstantial character. The Court has established  that “the rule articulated in the initial statement of C.P.P. Article 192, according to which ‘the existence of a fact cannot be inferred from circumstances’ — based, in rational terms, on the inherent ambiguity of circumstances themselves [ancorata, sul piano razionale, all’equivocità ontologicamente propria degli indizi], which enables them to be placed in (direct or inverse) causal relationships, with a multiplicity of causes or effects — serves to signify that [a single] circumstance is considered inadequate on its own to establish the facts [assicurare l’accertamento dei fatti].
[Such a circumstance] acquires probative value only when multiple pieces of evidence can all be traced to a single cause or a single effect. In applying this, therefore, the judge must first examine each item of evidence [indizio], identifying all its possible logical connections, then ascertaining their gravity, which is inversely proportional to the number of such connections, as well as the precision, which is correlated to the sharpness of [the item’s] contours, the clarity of its representation, to the direct or indirect source of knowledge from which it derives, [and thus] to its reliability. [The judge] must, finally, proceed to the final synthesis, ascertaining whether the items under examination are consistent [concordanti], i.e. whether they can be linked to a single cause or a single effect, so that the existence or nonexistence of the fact to be proved can be inferred.
This review of the Cassazione‘s jurisprudence on circumstantial cases grows out of the fact that the Corte di Assise di Appello has not conducted a unified evaluation of the evidence and has not examined the various items of evidence in a unified and global manner. In the ruling under appeal, it has, on the contrary, made a hash out of [sminuzzato] the evidence; it has assessed each piece of evidence in an isolated way according to an erroneous logical procedure, with the aim of critiquing its individual qualitative value; without noticing that, if it had followed the evaluative procedure dictated by the Cassazione, each item would have been integrated with the others, leading to an unambiguous clarification of what had been introduced [into evidence], so as to arrive at the logical proof of the fact: that is, the responsibility of the defendants for the murder.
The lower [distrettuale] Court, finding the procedure it followed to be correct, states in the ruling, “In the end, the first-level Corte di Assise , in order to reconstruct the case presented to it, concluded that it could coordinate factual elements (held to be certain in themselves, but whose meaning was not entirely unambiguous) into a unified picture [quadro] in which each one of the elements could be given [conseguire] a definitive explanation, and all of them, collectively, an unambiguous meaning, giving rise to proof of guilt.” (see p. 137 of the ruling).
The appeal judges, in fact, deny that evidentiary reasoning [il ragionamento probatorio] and the thinking and decision-making processes of the judge [are to] take their inspiration from the hypothetical-probabilistic model of evidence, in which the teachings of experience, statistical probability, and logical probability are given significant weight. The Judge must arrive at a decision through an “inferential – inductive” mechanism: one passes from individual certain facts, by means of inferences, through progressive causal sequences, to further, broader information, and then proceeds to the unification of these in the context of the theory reconstructing the events. This means that the facts which inform and justify the conclusions are not entirely contained within the premises, as would be the case if the reasoning were deductive in nature; instead, they are supplemented with other elements of knowledge outside of the premises themselves. An individual piece of evidence concerning a portion of the case is not, therefore, necessarily of unambiguous meaning. On its own, it is not enough. What is needed is the reasoning described above, characterized by an inferential argument [sequenza del silogismo inferenziale] in which the relationship that an individual fact has with others is made extremely prominent; when the various pieces of evidence all point in the same direction, in particular in the sense of confirming the prosecution’s theory, it is obvious that this will influence the judge. It would be highly “improbable”, in both statistical and logical terms, that the reality to be demonstrated, about which the Judge must make a decision, would be different from that indicated by the consistent direction of the evidence gathered.
Indeed, according to legitimacy jurisprudence, “In the evaluation of evidence, the judge must take into consideration each individual fact, and all of the facts together — not in a piecemeal way, detached from the general evidentiary context — and ascertain whether, both as reconstructed in themselves and placed in relation to each other, they can be arranged into a logical, harmonious, and consistent [consonante] construction which permits one to obtain the legal truth [verità processuale], i.e. the limited, humanly ascertainable and humanly acceptable truth in the case.” 
However, the Corte di Assise di Appello of Perugia has opted precisely for the piecemeal evaluation of individual pieces of evidence, as if each of them always had to have an absolutely unambiguous meaning, and as if the reasoning to be followed were deductive in nature.
This error emerges from the text of the ruling itself, but the seriousness of the error committed by the Court in its decision derives from the fact that even the individual pieces of evidence are introduced into the decision process [processo cognitivo-decisorio] in a wholly partial manner, singling out only those aspects that allowed doubt and uncertainty about the evidence itself to be found.
The ruling under appeal has completely neglected all the other aspects that agree with the prosecution theory; however, as shown in the motivation of the first-level ruling, these aspects had all been rigorously emphasized and considered by the C.A. in its decision.
In the examination of individual pieces of evidence, the ruling under appeal has consistently fallen into the error of lack of motivation and manifest illogicality thereof, something that can be inferred both from the text of the ruling and from the other records in the case, in particular the first-level ruling; that is, the error under letter e) of C.P.P. Article 606 paragraph 1, first and last part.
In the course of examining the various points of the ruling, we will explain the motivational errors that are to be found.
3. Violation of the principle dictated by C.P.P. Article 238 bis
The Corte di Assise di Appello accepted the request of the General Prosecutor to introduce into the trial record, in the sense of and for the purposes of C.P.P. Article 238 bis, the guilty verdicts — at first level (Attachment 1), appeal (see Attachment No. 2), and Cassazione (No. 3) — against Rudy Guede for the murder of Meredith Kercher, as the conviction had now become definitive.
A lively debate has arisen in jurisprudence and [legal] doctrine about the interpretation of C.P.P. Article 238 bis : “…rulings that have become irrevocable may be introduced as evidence [acquisite ai fini della prova] of the facts therein affirmed…”
By now, legitimacy jurisprudence has definitively inclined toward an interpretation according to which irrevocable rulings may be introduced into a trial, as contemplated in the aforementioned statute, but do not [themselves] constitute full proof of the facts therein affirmed; they require confirmation, not unlike statements of co-defendants in the same, or a related, proceeding.
It follows that the judge may not hold that the facts affirmed exist on the basis of the irrevocable ruling alone, but is [rather] obliged to identify external corroboration of the reconstruction in question, notwithstanding its definitive character.
Naturally, such corroboration is not necessary when the definitive ruling is not being directly used as proof [utilizzata ai fini di prova] but as confirmation of other circumstantial evidence or proof already introduced, not unlike what occurs with statements of prosecution witnesses [collaboratori di giustizia, lit. “collaborators of justice”] that confirm each other.
Precisely because of the function of a definitive ruling as corroborative and not as full proof, C.P.P. Article 238 bis does not require the ruling to have been issued against the persons accused in the specific [diverso, lit. “different”] proceeding in which it is used.
This is not an oversight on the part of the legislature, because the possibility of using evidence against the defendant that was established [formate] in another proceeding — [though] only if his or her attorney participated in its admission — is expressly contemplated in the preceding statute (C.P.P. Article 238, paragraph 2 bis) in the case of evidence admitted in a special evidentiary hearing [incidente probatorio] or during trial, and in that of evidence admitted in a civil case which has been subject to final judgement [un giudizio civile definito con sentenza passata in giudicato].
It should further be emphasized that, in such cases, the participation of the defense attorney in the admission [of evidence] allows the evidence in question to assume the force [efficacia] of full proof; whereas, in the case envisioned by C.P.P. Article 238 bis, this force does not exist, and the evidence must be objectively confirmed. The two situations are thus distinct [Si comprende quindi la diversità di disciplina, lit. “One thus understands a difference in discipline (i.e. subject matter)”]: if the defense attorney participates in the admission of the evidence, the proof is full; otherwise, objective confirmation is required.
The C.A.A., however, has stated, on pp. 26-27, “[I]n truth, the ruling in question, introduced under C.P.P. Article 238b and thus usable as evidence only as one among other elements evaluable under C.P.P. Article 192 paragraph 3… itself seems particularly weak as evidence, as the proceedings concerning Rudy Guede were held under the fast-track system [celebrato con rito abbreviato]”.
With consistent [pacifica] jurisprudence, which has been unwavering ever since Article 238 was added to the procedural code, the Supreme Court affirmed as early as 1994 that “in referring to ‘rulings that have become irrevocable’ in the situation of C.P.P. Article 238 bis, the legislature intended to make usable as evidence of the facts therein affirmed not only rulings issued following [regular] trial, but also those handed down following a fast-track process [giudizio abbreviato] or imposition of sentence [applicazione della pena] upon request; the rationale for this provision is, in fact, that of not dissolving [disperdere] relevant evidence [elementi conoscitivi, lit. “cognitive elements”] introduced in [judicial] actions [provvedimenti] which have in some manner acquired the authority of res judicata.”
In the proper interpretation of the cited Article 238 bis, the Supreme Court has gone further still, and has stated  that even a plea agreement [sentenza di patteggiamento] made in another criminal proceeding, being the legal equivalent of a guilty verdict, may indeed be introduced and assessed in the sense of C.P.P. Article 238 bis.
The “weakness of the definitive ruling against Rudy Guede” (claimed in violation of the Supreme Court’s teachings) is not the result of an in-depth analysis of the assertions contained therein and of their [alleged] disagreement with facts introduced in the first-level or appeal trial.
The premise [pregiudiziale] of the particular weakness of the judgement against R. Guede, abstractly asserted at the beginning, has in effect authorized the C.A.A. not to address the contents of the definitive ruling. The latter was not considered at all in the local Court’s motivation, even when the observations made about the questionability the first-level Court’s decision contrasted to such an extent with the ruling introduced into this case [i.e. the ruling against Guede] as to render them unsustainable. On this unsustainability, the motivation is completely lacking, and the ruling under appeal has fallen into the error under letter e) of C.P.P. Article 606 paragraph 1.
4. Failure to observe the law under C.P.P. Article 237
A reading of the ruling of the Corte di Assise di Appello of Perugia shows a conspicuous motivational flaw deriving from the failure to evaluate the note [memoriale] written by Amanda: the arguments used against the spontaneous statements are not available [spendibili] in this case, and important elements conflicting with [di segno contraro [a], lit. “of opposite sign to”] the conclusions of the Court can be inferred from this document; on these discrepancies, too, any and all motivation is lacking.
On the usability of the note, the Corte di Cassazione  had already spoken. In rejecting the petition submitted by attorneys for Amanda Knox against the procedural ruling dated 11-30-2007 of the Tribunale of Perugia in its function as court [giudice, lit. “judge”] of reexamination, it had stated (p.7): “According to these principles, the statements made by Amanda Knox at 1:45 am on November 6, 2007, after which the transcription was interrupted and the young woman was placed at the disposition of the appropriate judicial authority due to evidence having emerged against her, are usable only contra alios [Latin: “against others”, i.e. other people], while the ‘spontaneous statements’ of 5:45 am are usable neither against the suspect [indagata] nor with respect to other individuals accused of participation in the same crime, insofar as they were made without the legal protections [garanzie difensive, lit. “defensive guarantees”, presumably referring in particular to the right to an attorney] due to a person who had already formally assumed the role of a suspect. However, the note written by Knox in English and translated into Italian is fully usable, in the sense of C.P.P. Article 237, as this document derives from the suspect [herself], who was its spontaneous author, for defensive purposes. The order [disposizione] under examination allows evidentiary relevance [rilevanza probatoria] to be attributed to the document not only in and of itself and because of its representative content, but also by virtue of the particular link that connects it to the suspect (or defendant), thus highlighting the test for admissibility [il sindacato di ammissibilità] that the judge is required to perform.”
The content of the note written by Knox shows that the young American woman “had heard Amanda [recte: Meredith] scream, had stayed in the kitchen and covered her ears with her hands so as not to hear the screams of her friend, and had seen blood on Sollecito’s hand during dinner“.
In the motivation of the ruling under appeal, the position of the Court on the note (pp. 33 and 34) is absolutely contradictory. To deny value to the document, it asserts: “with regard to the murder, not only may the spontaneous’ statements not be used, but in reality neither may the note written later, since, although usable from a procedural standpoint, it does not deserve to be relied upon from a substantive one, as it does not represent what really happened in this case” (p.33). Subsequently, on p. 34, in affirming Knox’s responsibility for calumny, it contradicts itself by claiming that there is no “significant objective evidence that, when she made her spontaneous statements and wrote her note, Amanda Knox was in not only a situation of considerable psychological pressure and stress but also even in a condition of not intending or wishing; so that, having accused of such a serious crime a person whom she knew to be innocent, she must in any case be held responsible for the crime of calumny…”
The C.A.A. does not explain why the note is unreliable despite having been written by a person in possession of the full capacity of intending and wishing, so much so as to be convicted of calumny for accusations not only reported orally to the General Prosecutor, but repeated in certain passages of the note. Inexplicably, the ruling does not subject the contents of the note to any evaluation, contradicting what was stated by the Cassazione, which had dealt with it in the precautionary phase. In so doing, the ruling falls into the error of contradictory motivation (C.P.P. Article 606 paragraph 1, letter e)), as well as violating C.P.P. Article 237 (C.P.P. Article 606, paragraph 1, letter c)).
Attachment no. 00: Ruling of the Corte d’Assise of Perugia, no. 7/2009, of December 4-5, 2009, submitted March 4, 2010,
Attachment no. 01: Ruling of the G.U.P. [Giudice dell’Udienza Preliminare, “Judge of the Preliminary Hearing”] of Perugia of October 28, 2008 2009,
Attachment no 02: Ruling of the Corte di Appello of Perugia no. 7/2009 of Decemer 22, 2009, convicting Rudy Guede of the murder of Meredith Kercher.
Attachment no. 03: Cassazione Criminal Section I, ruling no. 1132-2010 of December 6, 2010 – Rudy Guede.
 M. COPI, C. COHEN, Introduzione alla logica [“Introduction to Logic”], Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, p. 141
 Ibid., p. 42
 Ordinarius professor at the Università degli Studi di Perugia, where she also teaches Logic and Legal Argument in the Corso di Laurea Magistrale [= master’s program] in jurisprudence, as well as Theory and Technique of Argument at the “Migliorini” School for Legal Professionals at the Università degli Studi di Perugia.
 S.G. SAGNOTTI, Retorica e logica, Aristotele, Cicerone, Quintiliano, Vico [“Rhetoric and Logic: Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Vico”] cit. p. 83
 M. COPI, C. COHEN, Introduzione alla logica [“Introduction to Logic”], Bologna, cit., pp. 147 and 651
 Ruling 4503 of 04/26/1995 RV. 201133
 Cass. Un. Crim. Sec. Ruling 33748 of 09/20/2005 Rv. 231678
 Sec. 6 Crim. Ruling 01327 of 05/14/1997 Rv. 208892
 hereafter C.A.
 Cass. United Sections July 10, 2002, Franzese
 Cass. Crim. Sec. VI Septemeber 5, 1996 no. 8314 (hearing June 25, 1996) “Cotoli E.M.”; Cass. Crim Sec. I , May 29, 1997, no. 5036 (hearing April 3, 1997) Pesce et al.
 most recently, Cass. Sec. 4, January 29, 2008, no. 1234, RV. 239299; Sec. 1, October 9, 2007, no. 46082, RV. 238167
 Cass. Crim. Sec. 2 Ruling no. 6755 of 05/19/1994 [Rv. 198107]
 Cass. Crim. Sec. 6 Ruling no. 10094 of 02/25/2011 [Rv. 249642]
 Crim. Sec. 1 Ruling no. 990/08